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Introduction 
 
Tony Lawson asks why and under what circumstances we should use the term 
‘neoclassical’ to refer to a specific school of economics. His answer is both nuanced 
and strategic. It is nuanced in the sense that, though Lawson believes that a 
conception of neoclassicism can be salvaged, that conception differs significantly 
from accounts defended by neoclassical economists themselves and by prominent 
historians of economic thought. It is strategic in the sense that, following a careful 
reconstruction of how Veblen’s original conception of neoclassicism might be 
extended to strands of modern economics, Lawson eventually suggests that the term 
should be abandoned. 
 
We begin with what we see as a major but under-emphasised contribution of 
Lawson’s paper: rendering the distinction between neoclassical and mainstream 
economics more precise. As Lawson points out, the frequent elision of the older 
conception of neoclassicism and the modern mainstream by historians, philosophers 
and practicing economists has been intellectually stultifying; supressing debate and 
neutralising effective critique. In Section 1, we briefly present Lawson’s analysis and 
contextualise it. We then go on to show that Lawson’s apparent rejection of the 
neoclassical label may not be desirable in the context of research in the history of 
economic thought. Whilst we agree that a reformulated conception of neoclassical 
economics may be of limited use for understanding the state of modern economics, it 
can nevertheless serve as a powerful analytical tool when analysing historical debates. 
It provides us with a way to address an important historiographical problem in the 
evolution of 20
th
 century economic thought. This is to chart the transformation of 
economics from the pre-WWII neoclassical theory to modern mainstream modelling. 
While this is a complex and multi-layered problem, we use Lawson’s distinction to 
investigate a particular transformation that relates to healthcare economics: the 
introduction and subsequent use of the concept of ‘moral hazard’ by economists. 
 
As recent policy debates have shown, models of moral hazard are now at the core of 
the discipline of economics to such an extent that they have been utilised as analytical 
and policy tools in a wide variety of contexts (Latsis and Repapis, 2014). In Section 2, 
we trace the humble origins of moral hazard as a peripheral element of Kenneth 
Arrow’s American Economic Review article ‘Uncertainty and the welfare economics 
of medical care’ (Arrow, 1963). This seminal article is widely regarded to be a key 
contribution to neoclassical economics because it effectively launched health 
economics as a field, and is also considered to be one of the pioneering contributions 
to the literature on informational asymmetries. Our discussion of Arrow (1963) 
reveals the tension between ontology and method that is characteristic of Lawson’s 
use of the term ‘neoclassical’. More importantly, however, by fitting Arrow’s 
contribution into Lawson’s mould, we gain a new perspective on and a better 
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understanding of the debates surrounding the paper, its initial reception and it’s 
subsequent use.  
 
In Sections 3 and 4, we highlight tensions that arose almost immediately between 
Arrow, the architect of what quickly came to be seen as a new framework for 
analysing healthcare, and those who wished to appropriate his insights to develop 
various subfields within economics. Differences in political ideology and theoretical 
assumptions are apparent in several cases, but the most pervasive and the least noticed 
tension can be identified at a deeper level. Whilst Arrow struggled with the mismatch 
between ontology and method that is typical of neoclassical theorising, most critics 
were blind to these concerns. Our analysis suggests that Arrow is a neoclassical in 
Lawson’s sense, however many of his interlocutors -- both followers and critics -- are 
not. Framing the debate in terms of the tension between ontology and methodology 
that is characteristic of Lawson’s version of neoclassicism provides a new perspective 
on the remarkable intellectual trajectory of one of Arrow’s key contributions to 
economic theory. 
 
 
1. Ontology and method in the neoclassical school 
 
Lawson starts with two puzzles that arise from the current use of the term 
‘neoclassical’ in economics: first that it is used in a vague and undisciplined way by 
both critics and supporters; and second that this usage undermines clear discussion 
and effective critique. These two observations point to the same problem, which is 
that because it is difficult to define neoclassicism in a non-controversial and widely 
accepted manner, it is unclear which authors or contributions can be called 
neoclassical in a meaningful way. The critique of neoclassical economics can thus be 
said to miss its target because the definitions used by critics are at odds with each 
other, or with the definition used by defenders, or the self-perception of the 
economists the term intends to describe. In addition, continuing debates about the 
‘true nature’ of neoclassicism can deflect attention away from the failings of modern 
economics, adding further confusion to the use of the term ‘neoclassical’. Lawson’s 
article seeks to address the interpretative puzzle by showing that a coherent 
conception of neoclassicism can be reconstructed based on Veblen’s early definition 
of the term. He does not claim to be able to resolve the second puzzle, arguing that the 
terminology of neoclassicism should be abandoned (at least insofar as it relates to 
current debates). 
 
Lawson’s definition of neoclassical economics draws heavily on Veblen, who was 
responsible for coining the term at the turn of the 20
th
 century. As Lawson (2013:967-
969) explains, Veblen’s neologism was carefully chosen to reflect both the influence 
of the modern ‘evolutionary’ approach (neo) and continuity with the older 
‘taxonomic’ approach (classical). He also recognised the tension that this 
juxtaposition of old and new had on the key neoclassical contributions of the late 19
th
 
century by Alfred Marshall and John Neville Keynes.  
 
“… I am suggesting that Veblen introduces the term ‘neoclassical to distinguish a line 
of thinking that is ultimately characterised by possessing a degree of ontological 
awareness whilst persevering with a methodology that is inconsistent with this 
awareness; it is a line of thinking identified precisely by this ontological / 
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methodological tension or inconsistency. Its practitioners recognise that social reality 
is a historical process of cumulative causation, but nevertheless continue to rely upon 
methods that require of reality that it conforms to given correlations, that render the 
science as still taxonomic” (Lawson, 2013:971) 
 
Lawson updates this definition by translating it into the language of social ontology. 
Veblen’s emphasis on taxonomy is identified with what Lawson calls deductivism, 
and thus with the methods of mathematical modelling. Veblen’s conception of an 
‘evolutionary approach’ is seen as equivalent to Lawson’s preferred ontology which 
sees the social realm as a causal-processual open system. Thus, according to Lawson, 
neoclassical economists are: 
 
 “those who are aware (at some level) that social reality is of a causal-processual 
nature… who prioritise the goal of being realistic, and yet who fail themselves fully to 
recognise or to accept the limited scope for any overly taxonomic approach including, 
in particular, one that makes significant use of methods of mathematical deductive 
modelling.”(Lawson, 2013:979)  
 
Lawson’s paper is concerned with the current state of economic theorising and brings 
forth two rather controversial consequences of this revised understanding of 
neoclassical economics:  
 
1) That the term ‘neoclassical’ picks out a group of economists who do not share 
a common core or set of assumptions in terms of substantive theorising, but 
rather are joined by their failure to recognise a fundamental inconsistency 
between ontology and method in their work. 
 
2) That many mathematically oriented, but self-defined heterodox economists 
could now be identified with this revised neoclassical category. 
 
 While this analysis raises a host of questions for the types of modern economic 
analysis, an important, consequence is to use Lawson’s argument to clearly delineate 
the previously sketchy boundaries between neoclassical and mainstream economics. 
The defining feature of mainstream economic analysis is that it does not suffer from 
the ‘neoclassical tension’ attributed to neoclassical theorising because, to paraphrase 
Lawson, mainstream economists are those who are (a) wedded to mathematical 
deductivism as the all-consuming scientific method, and (b) regard all analysis that 
deviates from this stance as lacking knowledge-building content(Lawson, 2013:978) . 
 
Our focus in the remainder of this paper engages directly with this distinction. Despite 
its controversial nature, we accept the fundamental plausibility of Lawson’s 
redefinition of neoclassical economics as both coherent and consistent with the 
historical origins of term. However we believe that the redefinition of neoclassicism 
has consequences that go beyond the contemporary debate about the state of modern 
economics and indeed beyond the current opposition between heterodox and 
mainstream economists. An unintended consequence of this clearly defined 
distinction between mainstream and neoclassical economics is that it provides us with 
a new tool to investigate important questions in the history of economic thought. For 
example: what is the historical relationship between mainstream and neoclassical 
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economics? If the mainstream emerged from neoclassical contributions, how and 
when did this transition occur?  
 
In order to shed some light on these important questions, we have adapted an 
illustrative case study focussing on the genesis of the concept of moral hazard in the 
economics literature. Our argument, presented in sections three and four, is that the 
introduction of moral hazard in Arrow’s seminal paper on healthcare bears all the 
hallmarks of Lawson’s neoclassicism. These are: inconsistency between ontology and 
method; tension between a commitment to understand the phenomena and a 
commitment to modelling them in a particular way; a desire to understand the 
specificity of the system under investigation (healthcare), while respecting the formal 
constraints of the ‘economic approach’ to analysing social problems. This internal 
struggle was ignored by subsequent economists who saw the article simply as a 
progenitor of mainstream economic analysis, thus misunderstanding its neoclassical 
stance. However, in order to see how this break occurred we first revisit Arrow’s 
seminal paper and give a reading of the article from this viewpoint. 
 
 
2. A reading of Arrow (1963) 
 
Arrow opens his article with: “This paper is an exploratory and tentative study of the 
specific differentia of medical care as the object of normative economics” (Arrow, 
1963:941). This sentence encapsulates what Arrow attempts to do: to describe the 
provision of medical care in the USA during the early 1960s and discuss why this 
provision seems to be so far removed from the competitive market model. He 
explains the analytical findings of the competitive model, the two welfare theorems, 
and finishes by noting “if… the actual market differs significantly from the 
competitive model… the separation of allocative and distributional procedures 
becomes, in most cases, impossible” (Arrow, 1963:943). In this passage the tension 
characteristic of neoclassical contributions first appears: Arrow explicitly considers 
the distance between model and reality.  If reality cannot be described in an accurate 
fashion by the paradigm, then it follows that questions about distribution and 
efficiency (what the mainstream would call positive and normative analysis), that 
formally arise in this literature, cannot be transferred to the real world. 
 
The question of how to compare real life – the set of practical problems raised by the 
functioning of the healthcare
1
 system – with the competitive model presents a 
methodological problem for Arrow. He points out that the methodological 
controversy has raged for more than a century but acknowledges Friedman’s well 
known instrumentalist argument as an influential contribution that claims to resolve 
the controversy by focussing solely on a model’s ability to predict (Arrow, 1963:944). 
However, without giving a decisive argument against Friedman, Arrow rejects the 
                                                 
1
 For consistency with the rest of the paper we use throughout this section the term healthcare instead 
of medical care. It is important here to note that Arrow explicitly avoided the term healthcare in his 
original contribution, noting that his article is about the conditions of providing medical coverage to 
individuals. In his opening paragraph he stresses that there are many factors that influence health and 
medical coverage is only one of them, but that that is what he intends to investigate (Arrow, 1963:941). 
This may be seen as another example of the neoclassical tension in Arrow’s article. Nevertheless, 
economists today use healthcare to denote this field of economic analysis, and for consistency we also 
follow this use. 
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approach of focusing on price and quantity predictions as the only relevant data that 
can be used to test the competitive model. Instead, he investigates “the institutional 
organisation and observable mores of the medical profession” (Arrow, 1963:944). 
Here again we see clear evidence of the neoclassical tension: Arrow seeks to compare 
the model with a realistic account incorporating the socio-economic context rather 
than relying on a simplistic quantitative approach.  
 
More specifically, he examines whether the preconditions for a competitive market 
system in medical care are actually met. These preconditions are: (1) existence of 
competitive equilibrium (2) marketability of all goods and services and (3) 
nonincreasing returns (Arrow, 1963:944). Marketability is identified as the main 
problem, and seen as a broader issue than the one analysed within the traditional 
externalities literature. Again, Arrow gives a very open and informal definition, 
writing “it will be sufficient to identify nonmarketability with the observed absence of 
markets” (Arrow, 1963:945) and focuses on two issues that create nonmarketability: 
risk and uncertainty. With risk he notes that while, due to illness and risk pooling, a 
well developed market should exist, it does not actually exist in practice (Arrow, 
1963:945). As for uncertainty, he writes that with “uncertainty, information or 
knowledge becomes a commodity” (Arrow, 1963:946). In this context, it can be 
argued that Arrow sees information problems as related to environmental factors 
rather than only behavioural responses to stimuli. It follows that uncertainty is a 
natural hindrance to a well-functioning market. But when markets fail to operate, 
nonmarket institutions occasionally fill the existing gap, and in healthcare the 
government and other charitable institutions play this role. With this observation 
Arrow ends his extensive introduction and forges ahead with a survey of the 
healthcare market, focusing on the elements that distinguish it from the competitive 
model. 
 
Arrows’ survey focuses both on the supply and demand characteristics of the 
healthcare market. A recurrent theme in this section is the issue of trust and the 
existence of institutions and behaviour that lie outside the competitive model. Arrow 
describes the behaviour of physicians in detail, noting that there are very strong social 
and moral norms governing their behaviour. In order to illustrate this he explains that: 
“[a physician’s] behaviour is supposed to be governed by a concern for a customer’s 
welfare which would not be expected of a salesman” (Arrow, 1963:949). Divergence 
from the competitive model is not only restricted to the action of physicians. Arrow 
also speaks of the prevalence of non-profit hospitals, and even non-profit educational 
establishments training students to become doctors at subsidised cost. While profit 
seems to play a reduced role in the provision of healthcare, trust appears central. 
Patients trust doctors, non-profit hospitals and educational establishments that give 
accreditation. The patient-doctor relationship is extensively explored, and trust is 
important there in order to deal with the complex nature of medical care and the 
uncertainty of disease. Arrow notes a special aspect of this relationship, the 
“informational inequality” between doctors and patients, something both parties are 
aware of. Finally, he notes that there is some friction between competitive business 
practices and trust. Physicians are expected to: provide advice that is “completely 
divorced from self-interest”; treatment that responds to “objective needs” and not 
financial considerations; certificates that confirm the existence of illnesses truthfully 
and not to please customers (see Arrow, 1963:950). Thus, the physician is trusted not 
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to abuse her special position by engaging in competitive practices that are both 
commonplace and arguably necessary in other markets. 
 
Having provided this elaborate and realistic description of the healthcare market, 
Arrow proceeds to compare it with two versions of the competitive model, first under 
certainty, and then under uncertainty. When he considers the comparison with the 
competitive model under certainty
2
, he finds that there are four major departures: non-
marketability, increasing returns, entry requirements for physicians and price 
discrimination. The analysis generally follows well-established economic arguments 
that would have been familiar to the academic reader of the period. For example, he 
discusses problems of externalities, or how licencing laws restrict entry, or how price 
discrimination may be used to maximise profits for a collective monopoly. The 
neoclassical tension is once again clear in this discussion as he disagrees with the 
standard interpretation of price discrimination as simply maximising profits for the 
medical profession, and argues that the incidence of charity by the medical profession 
shows “the relevance and importance of social and ethical factors” (Arrow, 
1963:957). 
 
However, it is in the comparison of the medical market with the competitive model 
under uncertainty that Arrow breaks new ground. He starts his analysis by 
characterising optimal or ideal insurance, noting that when you have risk averse 
individuals, an actuarially fair or almost fair insurance scheme is welfare improving 
due to risk pooling. Drawing on standard methodological tools, he provides formal 
proofs (in an appendix) for this analytical result, which show that “the nonexistence 
of suitable insurance policies…implies a loss of welfare” (Arrow, 1963:959). But this 
analytical finding presents two puzzles: first, why should this be the case? And 
second, what is the scope for government action? Arrow writes: “It follows that the 
government should undertake insurance in those cases where this market, for 
whatever reason, has failed to emerge. Nevertheless, there are a number of significant 
practical limitations on the use of insurance” (Arrow, 1963:961). The discussion that 
follows is tentative and is obviously intended to be exploratory. In it, Arrow faces the 
consequences of the juxtaposition of his formal methodology and the reality of the 
American healthcare system. He attempts to blend abstract economic analysis of the 
theoretical problems associated with insurance in a market economy with empirical 
descriptions of actual gaps in insurance coverage.  
 
It is in this discussion that Arrow introduces the problem of moral hazard. He writes: 
“one of the limits which has been much stressed in insurance literature is the effect of 
insurance on incentives. What is desired in the case of insurance is that the event 
against which insurance is taken be out of the control of the individual” (Arrow, 
1963:961). Later on he notes: “It is frequently observed that widespread medical 
insurance increases the demand from medical care” (Arrow, 1963:961). Nevertheless, 
in these crucial pages moral hazard is not given a more exact definition, and, 
interestingly, the incentives problem noted en passant and quoted above is not 
formally explored. This is in contrast to the way Arrow discussed the ideal insurance 
case, where the analytical results were clearly presented in the text and formal proofs 
provided in the Appendix. Instead, in the case of moral hazard, Arrow gives a general 
                                                 
2
 He defines conditions of certainty as “consumers are presumed to be able to distinguish qualities of 
the commodities they buy.” (Arrow, 1963:956) 
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discussion noting that there are behavioural responses which may be relevant to his 
analysis. Rather than providing a formal framework to analyse these responses, he 
provides an illustrative example: if you insure your house against fire, then there is 
the issue of carelessness and even arson, and similar problems may also arise in 
medical insurance. He then notes that “to some extent the professional relationship 
between physician and patient limits the normal hazard in various forms of medical 
insurance” (Arrow, 1963:961), though this is far from a perfect check. Interestingly he 
argues that where there is scrutiny and control of payments by third parties (other than 
the doctor and patient) then this may be effective in reducing moral hazard. 
Furthermore, this may explain why, in some areas of healthcare, insurance policies 
are more widespread than others, as some activities like surgery are under third party 
supervision whereas others, like GP visits, are not. 
 
In the last section of the paper Arrow is preoccupied with the problem of what 
happens when, due to the practical limitations discussed above, appropriate insurance 
markets do not, or have not, developed. He writes: “in the absence of ideal insurance, 
there arise institutions which offer some sort of substitute guarantees” (Arrow, 
1963:965). This is because with uncertainty, “[the patient] would want some 
guarantee that the physician is using his knowledge to the best advantage. This leads 
to the setting up of a relationship of trust and confidence, one which the physician has 
a social obligation to live up to” (Arrow, 1963:965). This relationship of trust, that he 
observed when he was doing a survey of the medical care market in the previous 
section, is not incidental to the workings of that market, but instead serves an 
economic purpose – it fills a gap created by the problem of uncertainty. This non-
market mechanism has its own rules that may actually further remove it from the 
competitive model. Arrow observes that “one consequence of such trust relations is 
that the physician cannot or at least cannot appear to act, as if he is maximizing his 
income at every moment in time” (Arrow, 1963:965). And again that “the very word, 
“profit” is a signal that denies the trust relations” (Arrow, 1963:965). Therefore trust 
is constitutive of the workings of the healthcare market, and it manifests itself across 
the key relationships that form the basis of the healthcare system: between patient and 
physician, in the certification and licencing of physicians by academic and other 
regulatory institutions, or even in the non-profit organisations that own and run 
hospitals. 
  
In the conclusion Arrow clearly states that his analysis of the healthcare market has 
two significant implications for economic theory. First the observation that “the 
failure of the market to insure against uncertainties has created many social 
institutions in which the usual assumptions of the market are to some extent 
contradicted” (Arrow, 1963:967). There are a host of interpersonal relations that have 
economic importance and, these non-market relations create “guarantees of behaviour 
which would otherwise be afflicted with excessive uncertainty” (Arrow, 1963:967). 
Second this means that the competitive model has natural limits in its descriptive 
powers. It is an important part of the economic canon, but it cannot be the full picture, 
for there are other institutions in existence organised across fundamentally different 
lines. Taken in conjunction with the preceding discussion of healthcare, the 
conclusion of Arrow’s paper stands out as a remarkably clear exemplar of what 
Lawson has called neoclassicism. There is an explicit avowal of the descriptive 
inadequacy of the standard economic paradigm, and of the existence of institutions 
that have developed and function in ways that are incompatible with it. This is a 
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powerful indicator of the tension that persists between Arrow’s concern to describe 
and understand socio-economic reality and the ontology imposed by standard 
techniques. There is also an equally explicit avowal of the limitations of the 
methodology of the competitive model as a tool. This is evident in his decision not to 
invoke a standard account in terms of event regularities in the analysis of moral 
hazard (as contrasted with the formal treatment of insurance in the appendix). The last 
line of the article provides an elegant summary of the neoclassical tension at work: 
“The logic and limitations of ideal competitive behaviour under uncertainty force us 
to recognize the incomplete description of reality supplied by the impersonal price 
system” (Arrow, 1963:967).  
 
 
3. Early reception: The first seven years 
 
Arrow’s article received attention from the moment it was published. In fact, even 
when the article was still in proofs Arrow presented it in the ‘secret’ seminar in 
Cambridge, as he was visiting Cambridge for the academic year of 1963-4,
3
 which 
means that the article was becoming rapidly well known on both sides of the Atlantic. 
In the first seven years since its publication Arrow was cited 18 times in economics 
journals. These included one citation in the following journals: Review of Economics 
and Statistics (Feldstein, 1970), Quarterly Journal of Economics (Akerlof, 1970), 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics (Ball and Wilson, 1968), Journal of Law 
and Economics (Lees, 1962), the Journal of Business (Pashigian, Schkade et al., 
1966), the Journal of Risk and Insurance (Pauly, 1970), the Journal of Human 
Resources. Three in Economica (Foldes, 1967; Williamson, Olson et al., 1967; 
Cotton, 1969). And finally eight in the American Economic Review (Arrow, 1965b; 
Boland, 1965; Lees and Rice, 1965; Diamond, 1967; 1968; Pauly, 1968; Crew, 1969; 
Newhouse, 1970). Of those eight, two where by Arrow in reply to published 
comments on his original paper. These early published comments and Arrow’s replies 
constitute two distinct theoretical debates that set the scene for the subsequent 
interpretation and use of the article. There are substantial differences in what these 
two debates focused on, but also on how they relate to the transformation of 
economics and in particular the emergence of modern mainstream economic 
theorising. 
 
The first citation of Arrow (1963) is by the British economist D. S. Lees (1962), in an 
article that analyses the UK National Health Service from a libertarian perspective. 
Lees argues that the basic problem of the NHS is not the nationalisation of the 
healthcare industry, but the abolition of prices for the services provided. This outcome 
makes healthcare a service outside what the market economy provides. The article 
continues by composing a list of arguments in favour of abolishing prices in medical 
care, and rebutting each in turn. One of the reasons tendered is that “medical care is 
“different” from other things that are normally bought and sold in markets”” (Lees, 
1962:114). It is in relation to this objection that Lees references Arrow (1963) and 
writes that he finds the arguments in Arrow unconvincing. He concludes by saying 
that even if the government objective is to enforce equality of consumption of medical 
care, it does not follow that “a non-market situation, one in which there are no prices 
is inescapably necessary to achieve this purpose” (Lees, 1962:116). He goes on to 
                                                 
3
 This is noted by G.C. Harcourt who attended the seminar. Private correspondence with the authors. 
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argue that this outcome can also be achieved through the market, and indeed this 
would be more compatible with how a free society works.  
 
A second paper by Lees and Rice, (1965) is the first of the two comments published 
in the AER in response to Arrow’s original paper. 4  They start by quoting the 
following passage from Arrow: “…for present purposes, it will be sufficient to 
identify nonmarketability [of risk-bearing] with the observed absence of markets… It 
follows that the government should undertake insurance in those cases where this 
market, for whatever reason, has failed to emerge.” (Arrow, 1963, pages 945, 961 
quoted in Lees and Rice, 1965:141) They make the following two counterpoints to 
Arrow’s claim: (1) due to buyer’s and seller’s costs, the absence of insurance policies 
for certain risks may be the optimal market response, not an inability of the market to 
develop, and (2) that it takes time for new types of insurance markets to emerge, but 
they do so eventually. The first point is formally explored, and shows that there may 
be optimal reasons for markets not emerging for some types of insurance. This 
argument is qualitatively different to the second one. There the authors argue that 
markets develop over time, as new needs create conditions for the emergence of 
products. They then suggest that since markets fill that gap in the long run, and since 
markets are assumed to be a desirable form of social organisation, then “whatever role 
government is to play in this transition, it would at least seem inappropriate to create 
permanent institutions to deal with what is essentially a temporary problem” (Lees 
and Rice, 1965:153).  
 
Lees’ libertarian position is implicit in both papers. He sees a fundamental 
antagonism between two types of social organisation – the market and the state – in 
which healthcare is a key battleground. His repeated critique of Arrow, despite its 
occasionally formalistic presentation, is firmly motivated by this normative 
perspective as he identifies Arrow as a defender of intervention in healthcare markets 
and hence, by proxy, a proponent of a state-sponsored healthcare system. Arrow’s 
response to Lees effectively recognises the normative flavour of the debate, though he 
seeks to separate analytical claims from “normative implications”. In the case of the 
former, he argues that not all institutional structures ‘out there’ can be analysed 
through the lens of market competition, citing a real world example to illustrate his 
point: “the Blue Cross-Blue Shield network is by no stretch of the imagination an 
example of a competitive market in health insurance. On the other hand, it would 
clearly be incorrect to regard it as a profit-maximizing monopoly. What has happened 
is a voluntary association has essentially played the role of a surrogate government” 
(Arrow, 1965b:156). What remains from this exchange is a genuine disagreement 
about the ability of the market system to deliver appropriate services in the healthcare 
sector. The debate of Lees and Rice vs. Arrow is ideologically charged, but it appears 
that the interlocutors understand that their disagreement is on personal values and 
competing systems of  social organisation.  
 
The second debate on Arrow’s paper was with Mark Pauly, following a comment 
published in AER in 1968.  Pauly starts by reviewing the exchange between Arrow 
and Lees and Rice, stating that there are actually better reasons than transaction costs 
                                                 
4
 There is also a contribution by Vincent Boland (1965), challenging some of the technical outcomes of 
the (Lees and Rice, 1965) comment, but his contribution is peripheral to our analysis here, other than 
an indication of how widely Arrow’s original paper and subsequent comments were read by the 
academic community.  
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for why “some insurances are not offered commercially” (Pauly, 1968:532). Pauly 
then turns to his main theme, the exploration of the problem of moral hazard, since, 
“in the controversy that followed [the exchange between Lees, Rice and Arrow] moral 
hazard seems to have been completely overlooked as an explanation of why certain 
types of expenses are not insured commercially” (Pauly, 1968:535 footnote 3). 
Furthermore, he argues that in the 1963 article, “Arrow appears to consider moral 
hazard as an imperfection, a defect of physical control….” or a ““practical limitation” 
on the use of insurance which does not “alter the case for creation of a much wider 
class of insurance policies than now exist.””(Pauly, 1968:535 footnote 3). Instead 
Pauly presents moral hazard in a completely different light. He starts by offering a 
formal definition, which is that by lowering the marginal cost of care to the 
individual, you will increase usage of medical care. This behavioural response is not a 
characteristic of the personality of the individual, an aspect taken into account in the 
insurance literature
5
, but a rational reaction. He insists that “the response of seeking 
more medical care with insurance than in its absence is a result not of moral perfidy, 
but of rational economic behaviour” (Pauly, 1968:535). This choice of words can 
appear odd. What exactly does Pauly mean? Arrow when quoting this line by Pauly in 
his rejoinder adds “Mr. Pauly’s wording suggests that “rational economic behaviour” 
and “moral perfidy” are mutually exclusive categories. No doubt Judas Iscariot turned 
a tidy profit from one of his transactions, but the usual judgement of his behaviour is 
not necessarily wrong” (Arrow, 1968:538). 
 
This a core disagreement between the two theorists that deserves further analysis. By 
analogy, Pauly’s argument may be recast in the following way: the fall of a large 
asteroid on planet earth that extinguishes all life is not the outcome of divine will, but 
simply the outcome of the laws of physics. By implication, any discussion of ethics in 
the situation of healthcare, is as irrelevant and ‘un-scientific’ as a discussion of 
theology in physics. A key disagreement, then, is whether human behaviour is 
completely determined by the axioms of rational choice in the same way that the law 
of gravity completely describes planetary movements. Here Pauly adopts the 
mainstream stance since he accepts the axiomatic straightjacket imposed by his 
formalisation of moral hazard. Arrow, on the other hand, is motivated by an attempt 
to understand the problems that might actually arise in healthcare insurance markets 
rather than those imposed by the structure of the model. 
 
By accepting the logic behind this analogy we can analyse the rest of Pauly’s 
argument in relation to moral hazard. If individuals are atomised and rational in the 
technical economic sense, and isolated from any cultural, ethical or social factors, 
then healthcare insurance faces the following problem. If the government decides to 
insure everyone against medical expenses, then the outcome is “to reduce the price 
charged to the individual at the point of service from the market price to zero” (Pauly, 
1968:532). There is a subtle, but very important difference between Lees and Rice’s 
argument that prices are abolished and Pauly’s argument that prices are reduced to 
zero. According to Pauly, the government, by covering healthcare costs, sets a 
specific price for the good in what effectively remains a market system. This world, 
populated by isolated atoms whose behaviour is mechanically determined by implicit 
or explicit price signals, responds to institutional change only through the effect it has 
                                                 
5
 Pauly mentions reactions like ‘hypochondria’ and “outright fraud” as issues that concern insurance 
writers. (See Pauly, 1968:535) 
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on the money denominated price of the good in question; the relevant event regularity 
in Lawson’s terms.6 
 
With a price of zero, the reader is lead to believe that demand will increase. The 
reason for this is because healthcare is treated like any other consumer good, with a 
possible range of demand elasticities. Pauly notes that if demand for healthcare goods 
is perfectly inelastic then moral hazard is not a problem, as demand would not 
increase with decreasing prices. It is interesting to observe here that Pauly is resting 
on very strong assumptions inherited from the competitive model: every economist 
knows that if the price of apples decreases people will buy more apples. But how does 
this translate in the real world market for medical care? In what way can consumers 
take advantage of the zero price? Will they undergo surgery when it is not medically 
necessary? Will they stay in hospital longer than required? Will they consume more 
pills or use more medical devices than they need? Or might they abuse their local GP 
privileges and clog waiting rooms? Pauly uses the visits to physician’s office as an 
example of a situation when an “increase in use in response to a zero price would be 
relatively great” (Pauly, 1968:535). But he makes a broader point, and this is that 
when you have inelastic demand and uncertainty, (as is the case with surgery) then 
insurance is provided through the market already, as moral hazard would not be a 
problem.
7
 
 
The outcome of this formalisation of the moral hazard is that when insurance should 
be provided it is already provided by the market. If it is not provided by the market, it 
can only be because the individual who purchases it has a tendency to overuse the 
services provided. Because the provider expects this rational reaction he charges more 
for the insurance than what is actuarially fair. But at these prices the individual finds 
it optimal not to buy insurance, as it is too expensive for the cover he needs. If the 
government provides this insurance and taxes the individual, the problem of overuse 
is still there, and the government substitutes one problem for another. Individuals will 
complain about high taxes to finance the system of provision and the solution will not 
be politically sustainable. After all, if they were willing to pay the cost of provision 
given the expectation of overuse the market would have provided the service without 
government intervention. Therefore, according to Pauly’s analysis, government action 
is redundant and harmful in all situations. 
 
This argument achieves an elegant transformation of the problem of market failure. It 
starts as in Arrow (1963) by presenting an ideal market in which appropriate 
insurance would exist if it was not for the adverse but rational behavioural response. 
This response gives rise to the actual market situation, in which optimality means that 
“some uncertain medical care expenses will not and should not be insured” (Pauly, 
1968:537). It then measures any government intervention, either outright central 
provision or policies in the form of co-insurance and deductables against the 
                                                 
6
 Importantly, shame or other emotions are not taken into account, although even someone who is 
committed to developing and using this type of mechanistic frameworks of analysis may argue that this 
influences the implicit price of ‘freely’ provided healthcare, so that prices do not have to go exactly to 
zero. 
7
 In this example Pauly is actually echoing what Arrow originally wrote in his 1963 article (see Arrow, 
1963:962), where surgery is viewed as less subject to moral hazard than GP prescriptions are. 
However, this occurs for different reasons. Arrow stresses 3
rd
 party supervision during surgery, 
whereas Pauly stresses the elasticity of demand for the particular good.  
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outcomes that the existing market can deliver, finding that no intervention, in this 
situation, can offer any improvement. By improvement what is meant here is very 
specific: moving closer to the idealised market represented by the competitive model 
in which the appropriate prices for the efficient provision of insurance exist. 
 
In his rejoinder Arrow starts by briefly stating the analytical finding that Pauly 
presents, and agreeing with him that in such a situation optimality will not be 
achieved “either by the competitive system or by an attempt by the government to 
simulate a perfectly competitive system” (Arrow, 1968:537). But then he questions 
Pauly’s “exclusive emphasis” on market incentives. He notes that insurance with 
rationing would solve the problem, and lists the following different ways rationing 
can take place:  
 
“(1) there might be a detailed examination by the insurance company of individual 
cost items allowing those that are regarded “normal” and disallowing others, where 
normality means roughly what would have been bought in the absence of insurance; 
(2) they may rely on the professional ethics of physicians not to prescribe frivolously 
expensive cost of treatment, at least where the gain is primarily in comfort and luxury 
rather than in health improvements proper; (3) they may even, and this is not as 
absurd as Mr. Pauly seems to think, rely on the willingness of the individual to behave 
in accordance with some commonly accepted norms” (Arrow, 1968:538). 
 
This list is an explicit avowal of the neoclassical tension apparent in Arrow’s original 
paper. Whilst the first of the three reasons can be analysed within Pauly’s narrow 
incentive framework, the following two cannot. Broader ethical and institutional 
factors that are drawn from observation and experience of the functioning of real 
healthcare services in society are the source of Arrow’s critique. For Arrow shows the 
limits of this framework of analysis, as he writes: “the lesson of Mr. Pauly’s paper is 
that the price system is intrinsically limited in scope by our inability to make factual 
distinctions needed for optimal pricing under uncertainty. Nonmarket controls, 
whether internalized as moral principles or externally imposed are to some extent 
essential for efficiency” (Arrow, 1968:538). 
 
Unlike the previous debate, the Arrow vs. Pauly controversy cannot be analysed 
simply as an ideological disagreement, although they do occupy different sides of the 
ideological spectrum. A deeper philosophical divide separates the two authors, despite 
their reliance on a common technical toolbox to articulate their arguments. Pauly 
follows what was to become the standard mainstream approach by decontextualising 
the analytical framework and producing a model of moral hazard that is specifically 
defined, formally precise and highly portable between different real world 
applications. Arrow, on the other hand, refuses to ignore the complexity and openness 
of real healthcare systems when addressing problems of allocation and distribution. 
As a result the technical apparatus of modern economics can only take him so far and 
he recognises its weaknesses and limits when he faces them. 
 
This exchange is also an early indication of the changes that would eventually lead to 
the dominance of a modern mainstream in which the scientific status of economics is 
judged purely on methodological grounds. This is evident in the disagreement 
between Arrow and Pauly on the relevance of ethics in the analysis of human conduct. 
In the coda of his response, Arrow writes “one of the characteristics of a successful 
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economic system is that the relations of trust and confidence between principal and 
agent are sufficiently strong so that the agent will not cheat even though it may be 
“rational economic behaviour” to do so. The lack of such confidence has certainly 
been adduced by many writers as one cause of economic backwardness” (Arrow, 
1968:538). Marshall – the archetypal neoclassical in both Veblen’s and Lawson’s 
terms – wrote the following in the first chapter of his Principles on the advances of 
modern society “…modern methods of trade imply habits of trustfulness on the one 
side and a power or resisting temptation and dishonesty on the other, which do not 
exist among a backward people….Adulteration and fraud in trade were rampart in the 
middle ages to an extent that is very astonishing, when we consider the difficulties of 
wrong-doing without detection at that time” (Marshall, 1891:18). Arrow and Marshall 
clearly share an ontological perspective that links economic behaviour to broader 
social processes and aims to extend beyond the limits imposed by their reliance on 
deductive techniques.  
 
Pauly, in contradistinction was looking ahead to how economic theory was to develop 
in subsequent decades. He returned to healthcare markets in 1970, in an article that 
further developed the concept of moral hazard by analysing “different varieties” of 
this problem in healthcare and other types of insurance (Pauly, 1970). In this paper he 
finds that a price of zero creates all kinds of distortions in a market system, but notes 
that interventions that appropriately alter incentives may have a positive effect in the 
market. More importantly, 1970 is a watershed date for economic theory because it 
marks the publication of Akerlof’s celebrated market for lemons article (Akerlof, 
1970). Akerlof not only cites Arrow (1963) but starts his article by noting that “this  
paper  presents  a  struggling  attempt  to give  structure  to  the  statement:  "Business  
in  underdeveloped  countries  is  difficult";  in  particular,  a  structure  is  given for  
determining  the economic  costs  of dishonesty” (Akerlof, 1970:488). While this 
seems to be an allusion to the literature that Arrow was also pointing at in his 
response to Pauly, it becomes quickly apparent that the terms of the discussion have 
changed. The basic problem is one of information between different market 
participants, and Akerlof rigorously shows that asymmetries of information create all 
types of problems for efficient market interaction. Even dishonesty is treated in 
informational terms; if purchasers knew who the dishonest sellers are, there would be 
no inefficiencies in the market. In fact, Akerlof returns to the problem of public 
healthcare, and adds the following observation to the discussion Arrow vs. Pauly: 
 
“He [Arrow] emphasizes “moral hazard” rather than “adverse selection”. In the strict 
sense “moral hazard” is equally disadvantageous for both governmental and private 
programs; in its broader sense which includes “adverse selection”, “moral hazard” 
gives a decided advantage to government insurance programs.” (Akerlof, 1970:493) 
  
Akerlof is ideologically on the same side as Arrow favouring government insurance 
programs. However, he uses Pauly’s mainstream framework to make his argument 
and leaves behind him the neoclassical tension we located in  Arrow (1963) . The 
idealised market system in which informational problems do not exist is the 
measuring rod not only for any existing market, but also for any government 
intervention. What Pauly identified as a behavioural response – a ‘rational reaction’ 
by agents – thus received its final transformation and subsequent standardization into 
an informational problem. This pushed any discussion of social norms and their 
ethical underpinnings into the background, as economics established itself on new 
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ground which encompassed the whole ideological spectrum by distancing it from real 
world problems. 
 
 
4. Becoming a Classic: The next 40 years 
 
Arrow’s paper on medical care is one of the most heavily cited papers ever published 
by the American Economic Review. As an indication of its success, it has 1,528 
articles citing it in the web of science core collection and more than 6,000 in Google 
scholar (search on 6/02/2015). It was also chosen as one of the 20 most important 
articles published in AER in its first 100 years. Furthermore, it has not only became a 
key text in economic theory, but it is also widely cited by academics and 
policymakers in a number of other fields, including law, sociology, political science, 
health policy and insurance. In fact, as Mark Peterson shows, whilst in the first decade 
of its publication it held greater significance for economists, by the 1990s it had 
became a focus of attention for non-economists as well (Peterson, 2001:825). 
 
The neoclassical tension apparent throughout the paper explains both its early success 
within economics and its enduring influence in the other social sciences and policy 
circles. It is beyond the scope of this section to describe the whole interdisciplinary 
literature that follows Arrow’s (1963) article. Surveys on the impact of Arrow’s 
article in a variety of fields can be found in Vol. 25 No. 5 of the Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law published in October 2001. There an array of articles by 
leading scholars in their fields are joined with a forward by Mark Pauly, and a 
postscript by Arrow, giving a more complete view of the impact Arrow’s article had 
across disciplines including economics in its first 40 years since publication. 
However, for our purposes, it is sufficient to point out that whilst social scientists who 
were unhampered by the ontological limitations of the economic method took a 
variety of different messages from Arrow’s article, the economic use of his arguments 
has been much more limited.  
 
Arrow is generally seen as providing a pioneering and influential analysis of 
healthcare, but amongst economists he is generally cited as the source of the modern 
conceptualisation of a type of market failure. In this context, his introduction of the 
idea of moral hazard has been extremely influential, and it is as a forerunner of the 
moral hazard and asymmetric information literature that the article is principally 
remembered in mainstream economics today.
8
 In other words, it is principally Pauly’s  
interpretation of Arrow’s paper that has dominated economics. The neoclassical 
tension that Arrow clearly struggled with when beginning the economic analysis of 
healthcare has been set aside. Instead Arrow’s paper is now seen as a necessary but 
incremental stage in the ‘progressive’ mainstream project of transforming health 
economics into a formal subfield populated by microeconomic models of asymmetric 
information. The committee that chose the top twenty articles ever published in the 
AER makes this last point explicitly: 
 
                                                 
8
 But not exclusively. For example Newhouse’s (1970) frequently cited article deals with a theory of 
non-profit institutions, by presenting an economic model of a hospital and this follows one of the 
insights found in Arrow (1963). But on the whole, it is safe to say that these other strands of research 
are nowhere near in volume and influence in comparison to the moral hazard literature.  
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“This paper provided a framework for thinking about the economics of the market for 
medical care using the language and tools of modern microeconomics. It argued that 
the aforementioned market is beset by market failures because consumers are exposed 
to risks that are not fully insurable (in large part due to problems of moral hazard), 
and because they lack the information and expertise required to assess risks and 
treatments. It hypothesized that various salient features of the institutions governing 
the provision of medical care are best understood as social adaptations aimed at 
redressing the resulting inefficiencies. It also noted that in some cases those 
institutional adaptations undermine competition and perversely contribute to 
inefficiency. Though written well prior to the emergence of the formal literature on 
asymmetric information, the paper anticipated many of the central issues that continue 
to occupy health economists today.” (Arrow, Bernheim et al., 2011:2) 
 
A more eclectic and partial way to see how the paper entered the canon of mainstream 
economics is to observe that it has been cited in three Nobel laureate lectures, those of 
Kenneth Arrow, James Mirlees and Joseph Stiglitz. This, in itself, is remarkable 
enough, as none of these Nobel prizes where particularly related to developments in 
the healthcare market. However, in all three cases it is the wider ramifications of the 
abstract findings of the paper that make it key in the literature that these lectures 
survey. First Kenneth Arrow himself mentioned the paper in his 1972 lecture, when 
discussing general equilibrium and uncertainty, noting that ‘moral hazard’ is a 
problem when you have unobservable behaviour and insurance. He then writes: “I 
would hold that the allocational difficulties arising from the inequality in information 
are of importance in such diverse fields as medical care and racial discrimination” 
(Arrow, 1974:269) before referring to the (1963) article. Then, James Mirlees in 1996 
devotes a section of his lecture on moral hazard, and after defining the concept notes 
“Medical care has been regarded as a prime example in the economics literature, 
perhaps surprisingly” (Mirrlees, 1997:1323) before referring both to Arrow (1963) 
and Pauly (1968). Finally, Joseph Stiglitz devotes a section of his lecture on 
‘Sharecropping and the General Theory of incentives’, arguing that with imperfect 
information, people’s incentives became a problem. Therefore, “the adverse effect of 
insurance on incentives to avoid the insured-against contingency is referred to as 
moral hazard“  (Stiglitz, 2002:465). In a footnote he notes that the concept comes 
from insurance literature and adds “Not taking appropriate care [when having 
insurance] was thought to be "immoral"; hence the name” (Stiglitz, 2002:465 footnote 
10) before referring to Arrow’s work (Arrow, 1963; 1965a) as an important precursor 
for the literature on moral hazard that followed.  
 
This short history illuminates how mainstream economics integrated Arrow’s work 
with developments in economic theory over the next 50 years. Pauly in his forward of 
a special issue of the Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, celebrating in 2001 
almost 40 years of Arrow’s article, eloquently writes “The introduction to health 
economics of the topic of moral hazard ignited a firestorm of interest in the impact of 
insurance on the process of care, with both theoretical and empirical dimensions. The 
major empirical topic was the measurement of the extent of moral hazard, and the 
major theoretical question was how that magnitude would affect the ideal design of an 
insurance policy that relied on patient cost-sharing to limit medical spending” (Pauly, 
2001:830). This research agenda persists to this day as economists continue to explore 
the empirical and theoretical complications of the problem of incentives in markets 
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with different varieties of imperfect information (See e.g. Einav, Finkelstein et al., 
2013). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We began our argument by noting that Tony Lawson’s reinterpretation of 
neoclassicism provides much needed clarity to the discussion about what neoclassical 
economics is and how and when we should use the term. This clarity comes at a price 
insofar as the critique of modern economic theorising is concerned, because it would 
essentially define neoclassicism through its deficiencies and hence it could be seen as 
an attempt to pathologise neoclassical economists. As Lawson notes, it would also 
necessarily lead to the reclassification of many heterodox economists as 
‘neoclassical’. In this paper we have set aside these concerns without wishing to deny 
their importance. This is because we intended to explore an under-researched 
corollary of Lawson’s argument. When applied to question of the transformation of 
economic thought in the 20
th
 century, Lawson’s revised conception of neoclassicism 
has important uses and yields novel insights. Our example, drawing on the history of 
healthcare economics, seeks to illustrate this. Firstly, we have demonstrated that 
interpreting Arrow’s 1963 paper as suffering from ‘neoclassical tension’ is crucial to 
understanding the debates that emerged after it was published, but also important in 
placing this contribution in the canon of neoclassical theory that preceded it. 
Secondly, we have shown that by mapping the key differences between mainstream 
economics and neoclassicism we can similarly illuminate our understanding of the 
appropriation, formalisation and development of Arrow’s ideas by subsequent 
theorists Thus we demonstrate that this distinction can be used to analyse an 
important chapter in the history of economic analysis, the post-war transition from 
neoclassical theory to mainstream model building 
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